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A LITIGATION-ORIENTED APPROACH TO TEACHING FEDERAL 
COURTS 
MICHAEL L. WELLS* 
INTRODUCTION 
Back in the day when Critical Legal Studies was riding high, one of its 
avatars ridiculed the course on Federal Courts, calling it “the purest of 
contentless legalist rituals, in which all ‘policy’ arguments are grounded in 
funhouse mirror versions of Competence and Federalism whether they can 
conceivably be brought to bear on particular cases or not.”1  Mark Kelman’s 
putdown should not be taken too seriously.  Twenty five years later, Critical 
Legal Studies has largely disintegrated,2 while Federal Courts remains a key 
course in law school curriculums.  I suspect, however, that many law students 
would agree, at least in some measure, with Professor Kelman’s 
characterization.  In my contribution to the symposium, I wish to argue that the 
traditional way of teaching Federal Courts, which draws heavily on ideas 
embodied in a fifty-five year old casebook, no longer serves the interests of 
law students as well as it once did.  As an alternative, I propose an approach 
that emphasizes the knowledge and understanding that students will need in 
order to become effective litigators. 
I.  TWO WAYS OF TEACHING FEDERAL COURTS 
A. The Legal Process Method 
In 1953, Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler published The Federal Courts 
and the Federal System3 and revolutionized the teaching of Federal Courts.  
 
* University of Georgia Law School.  The author wishes to thank Bill Marshall and Gene Nichol 
for helpful comments on a draft. 
 1. Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293, 319 n.65 (1984). 
 2. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 9 (1997) (“The social/ 
political/intellectual network that ‘was’ cls in the late 1970s and early 1980s came apart in the 
late 1980s . . . . But there are various successor networks that are as active as ever.”); Robert C. 
Ellickson, Trends in Legal Scholarship: A Statistical Study, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 525 n.21, 
527 (2000) (citation study documenting “the rise and fall of Critical Legal Studies”). 
 3. HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM (1953). 
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Their emphasis on “the distribution of power between the states and the federal 
government,”4 “what courts are good for,” and “the whole range of questions 
as to the appropriate relationship between the federal courts and other organs 
of federal and state government”5 marked a striking departure from earlier 
works, which had concentrated on federal procedure.  Along with another set 
of materials Hart prepared in collaboration with Albert Sacks,6 The Federal 
Courts “defin[ed] what has come to be one of the most important schools of 
legal thought in late twentieth–century America, typically described as ‘the 
legal process school.’”7  The Legal Process and the “Hart & Wechsler 
Paradigm” “focus[] primary attention on who is, or ought, to make a given 
legal decision, and how that decision is, or ought, to be made.”8  This model 
soon became the dominant mode for both teaching and scholarship in Federal 
Courts law.9  At most schools, the course began to focus on the distribution of 
decision-making authority among the branches of the national government and 
between the states and the federal government.  Judging by the organization 
and content of Federal Courts casebooks, this dominance continues today. 
In Hart and Wechsler, now in its sixth edition,10 and in other casebooks 
that follow its approach,11 the threshold question is “[t]he [n]ature of the 
[f]ederal [j]udicial [f]unction,”12 and the ways by which the scope and limits of 
federal judicial power are manifested in the doctrines of standing to sue and the 
justiciability of a given dispute.  The power of Congress to regulate federal 
judicial power comes close behind.13  These matters of basic theory are 
followed by examinations of narrower distribution-of-authority issues.  Here, 
the books diverge on the sequence in which these matters are treated.  Hart and 
 
 4. Id. at xi. 
 5. Id. at xii. 
 6. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN 
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 
1994).  The book circulated in manuscript form for thirty-six years before its publication.  See id. 
at xi. 
 7. Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REV. 688, 691 (1989) (book review). 
 8. Id. 
 9. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. 
REV. 953, 956 (“Hart and Wechsler defined the field as we now know it . . . .”). 
 10. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. 
SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (6th ed. 
2009). 
 11. See, e.g., DONALD L. DOERNBERG, C. KEITH WINGATE & DONALD H. ZEIGLER, 
FEDERAL COURTS, FEDERALISM AND SEPARATION OF POWERS (4th ed. 2008); see also MARTIN 
H. REDISH & SUZANNA SHERRY, FEDERAL COURTS (6th ed. 2007). 
 12. FALLON, MANNING, MELTZER & SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 49. 
 13. Id. at 319; DOERNBERG, WINGATE & ZIEGLER, supra note 11, at 163; REDISH & 
SHERRY, supra note 11, at 106. 
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Wechsler begins with the Supreme Court’s role in reviewing the state courts,14 
the scope of federal common law making,15 federal district court jurisdiction,16 
federal judicial control over state governments,17 sources of friction between 
federal and state courts, and ways of minimizing that friction.18 
A premise underlying the examination of all of these topics is that “the 
central, organizing question of Federal Courts doctrine involves allocations of 
authority.”19  Some of these allocation issues are, so to speak, horizontal (i.e., 
they concern the distribution of power among the Legislative, Executive, and 
Judicial Branches).  Others are vertical, in that they focus on state/federal 
relationships.  What all of them have in common is that they can usefully be 
addressed by relegating issues of substantive federal law to secondary status.  
Richard Fallon, the leading academic spokesman for the Hart and Wechsler 
approach, acknowledges that such matters have some bearing on the allocation 
issues.20  Still, the premise that ties the field together is the “principle of 
institutional settlement,” which holds that courts can identify and implement 
trans-substantive principles for allocating decision making among the 
institutions of government,21 and de-emphasizes the role of substantive 
values.22  Taking this premise as their starting point, many of the finest minds 
in the legal profession have found Federal Courts to be the most intellectually 
stimulating course in law school, and a number of them have gone on to 
become scholarly experts in the field.23 
 
 14. FALLON, MANNING, MELTZER & SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 431. 
 15. Id. at 607. 
 16. Id. at 743. 
 17. Id. at 869. 
 18. Id. at 1013 (abstention doctrines), 1153 (habeas corpus), 1311 (res judicata). 
 19. Fallon, supra note 9, at 962. 
 20. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Comparing Federal Courts “Paradigms,” 12 CONST. 
COMMENT. 3, 6 (1995) (“[T]he richness of the Legal Process approach resides in its sensitivity to 
the subtle interactions of and overlap between substantive and procedural interests in 
jurisdictional decisions.”). 
 21. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Commentary, The Making of The 
Legal Process, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2045 (1994) (discussing the crucial role of institutional 
settlement in Hart and Sacks’s Legal Process materials); Fallon, supra note 9, at 964 n.48 
(discussing the principle of institutional settlement and its key role in the Hart and Wechsler 
approach to Federal Courts law). 
 22. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 21, at 2050 (“The principle of institutional 
settlement suggested that legal process thinkers did not consider substantive fairness to be a 
primary element of political legitimacy.”). 
 23. See Amar, supra note 7, at 691–93 (discussing scholars and scholarship inspired by the 
Hart and Wechsler casebook). 
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B. The Litigation-Oriented Approach 
There is, however, another way to address the subject matter of Federal 
Courts, one that favors practical utility over academic theory.  I favor a 
perspective that, for the lack of a better term, I shall call a “litigation-oriented 
approach.”  What I mean by this term is that the course concentrates on 
examining questions that would interest lawyers in their professional lives.  
These questions include, among others: “What are the opportunities for 
litigating a given dispute in federal court?”; “What obstacles may stand in the 
way?”; “What distinctive doctrines does one need to know in order to litigate 
federal claims, especially federal constitutional claims?”; “What types of 
problems come up when one litigates in state court?”; and “What are the 
advantages and disadvantages of litigating in federal rather than state court?” 
This way of treating Federal Courts does not pay close and sustained 
attention to such “Hart and Wechsler” questions as these: “What is the role of 
the federal courts in our system of separation of powers?”; “Should the federal 
courts be used to reform society through public law litigation, and if so, how?”; 
“What principles of federalism should courts use to resolve conflicts between 
federal courts and state governments?”  The choice of one set of inquiries 
rather than another is one of emphasis.  The latter set of questions certainly 
needs to be addressed in order to understand the cases.  Unlike the treatment 
they receive under Hart and Wechsler, however, they are not framed as 
freestanding topics.  Instead, they are viewed as sources for arguments as to 
how to answer the issues a litigator is concerned with.  By contrast, my sense is 
that in many Federal Courts courses that take Hart and Wechsler as their 
guide, the emphasis is reversed: the issues of interest to litigators are taken as 
occasions for taking up these larger issues of federalism and separation of 
powers. 
II.  HOW A LITIGATION-ORIENTED APPROACH WORKS 
This difference in emphasis leads to a difference in the organization of the 
course. A course that follows the model set out in The Federal Courts and the 
Federal System would begin with questions about the role of federal courts in 
our system.  But from a litigation-oriented perspective, the most important 
question is how one gets into federal court.  The main federal statute for 
litigating constitutional challenges to state action is 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Yet 
examination of this statute is deferred until one is deeply into the course, after 
a thorough immersion in these general allocation-of-power principles.24  In this 
conception of the course, the cause of action authorized by § 1983 is treated as 
 
 24. The current edition of Hart and Wechsler reaches § 1983 in the middle of chapter 9, after 
devoting over nine hundred pages to other matters.  See FALLON, MANNING, MELTZER & 
SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 942.  
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nothing more than a manifestation of the general principles governing the 
relations between the federal courts, on the one hand, and state officers and 
local governments on the other.  Other books follow more or less the same 
structure.25  Some give § 1983 only perfunctory treatment while others provide 
extensive coverage.26  But for all of them, the premise behind organizing the 
course in this way seems to be that general propositions should come first, 
followed, if the teacher is so inclined, by the (comparatively less significant) 
particulars of § 1983 litigation.  My sense is that most current casebook 
authors simply follow the path blazed by Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler in 
1953, before the rise of § 1983 and the rest of the modern law of constitutional 
litigation. 
A. Beginning with § 1983 
My litigation-oriented Federal Courts course starts from the opposite 
premise.  It begins with 42 U.S.C. § 1983, then moves on to federal common 
law, federal question jurisdiction, standing, sovereign immunity, abstention, 
federal law in the state courts, Supreme Court review, habeas corpus, and 
concludes with the highly abstract, theoretically important, but largely 
unresolved issues raised by Congress’s Article III power over the federal 
courts.27  Section 1983 comes first because anyone who litigates in federal 
court will benefit from knowing it thoroughly.  It is the statutory source of the 
cause of action litigants ordinarily use in order to challenge state action on 
federal constitutional (and some statutory) grounds.  We study it not only 
because it is important in its own right, but also because § 1983 litigation is the 
context in which the Court typically addresses pressing questions of judicial 
federalism and because it  provides a template for federal litigation which, 
once mastered, can readily be adapted to other contexts as well.  Section 1983 
is a powerful tool that, in my view, every future litigator should learn about in 
law school.  It should be studied in Federal Courts because, in practice, many 
of the other doctrines examined in the course—including justiciability and 
standing, sovereign immunity, abstention, and res judicata—typically arise in 
 
 25. See, e.g., DOERNBERG, WINGATE & ZIEGLER, supra note 11, at 509 (chapter 6 examines 
§ 1983); REDISH & SHERRY, supra note 11, at 303 (chapter 6). 
 26. Though PETER W. LOW & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF 
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS (6th ed. 2008), arrives at § 1983 rather late in the day, they accord it 
an especially detailed treatment.  See id. at 1151–1379 (chapter 9).  At the other extreme, in one 
casebook, § 1983 and Supreme Court cases interpreting it receive only passing mention in a 
footnote.  See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, JOHN B. OAKLEY & DEBRA LYN BASSETT, FEDERAL 
COURTS 530–31 n.7 (12th ed. 2008). 
 27. My organization of the course follows the casebook on which I collaborate with two 
distinguished Federal Courts teachers.  See MICHAEL L. WELLS, WILLIAM P. MARSHALL & 
LARRY W. YACKLE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL COURTS (2007).  The opinions 
expressed in this paper, however, are solely my own. 
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the course of a § 1983 suit.  Studying § 1983 at the outset gives students the 
context necessary for understanding how those doctrines actually work. 
For these reasons we begin the course by discussing the breadth of the 
cause of action recognized in 1961 in Monroe v. Pape,28 the leading modern 
case that revived the long-dormant statute.  We then move on to limits on § 
1983 recovery, including the official immunity doctrine that precludes the 
award of damages in many situations29 and the rejection of vicarious liability 
for municipalities in Monell v. Department of Social Services.30  The 
discussion turns next to such matters as the opportunities left open by Monell 
for suing municipalities,31 and the prospects for using § 1983 to enforce federal 
statutes.32  In the course of examining these matters, we stress the differences 
between the “offensive” remedy provided by the statute and “defensive” 
remedies of the kind that are typically available in the criminal process.  It 
becomes evident that offensive remedies existed long before the rise of § 1983, 
going back at least to Ex parte Young.33  Students learn that these offensive 
remedies raise a host of new questions that they may not have encountered in 
either Criminal Procedure or Constitutional Law.  The discussion of official 
immunity, in turn, highlights the differences between two kinds of offensive 
remedies—prospective and retrospective.  While immunity is rarely a problem 
when a prospective remedy is sought, it is a significant obstacle to 
retrospective relief.  Introducing the prospective-retrospective remedy 
distinction early on provides necessary background for elaborating on the 
strengths and weaknesses of the two remedies later on in discussions of 
standing, sovereign immunity, and abstention. 
Though the course begins with § 1983, it is not a “civil rights” course.  The 
“federal courts” focus soon becomes apparent as we use the statute as a bridge 
to take us to federal common law.  Section 1983 speaks in sweeping terms.  
Unlike modern statutes, it ignores most of the issues that arise in litigation.  
The gaps in the text invite a discussion of the process by which the Supreme 
Court fills in the gaps, and that analysis provides students with a concrete 
illustration of federal common law, situated in a context they fully understand.  
Given the highly abstract issues raised by the formation of federal common 
law, the pedagogical utility of the § 1983 example is considerable. 
 
 28. 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961). 
 29. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806–07 (1982). 
 30. 436 U.S. 658, 691–92 (1978). 
 31. See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 380 (1989); Pembaur v. City of 
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986). 
 32. See, e.g., City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 120 (2005); Gonzaga 
Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284–85 (2002). 
 33. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).  For pre-Young developments, see Ann Woolhandler, The Common 
Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled Remedies, 107 YALE L. J. 77 (1997). 
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Our examination of judge-made law in § 1983 lays a foundation for 
turning to a more systematic treatment of federal common law.  Just as the 
courts must make a considerable amount of federal law in § 1983 litigation, the 
same need for federal common lawmaking arises in other contexts for a 
number of distinct reasons.  By now we have left § 1983 behind and are 
dealing with general problems of judicial federalism.  The focus here is on 
when and why courts should make federal common law.  Accordingly, one of 
the aims of examining federal common law is to identify as concretely as 
possible what those reasons are.  These intensely practical issues can be 
addressed quite successfully without a detailed examination of United States v. 
Hudson & Goodwin,34 Swift v. Tyson,35 or even Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins.36  Here, as throughout the course, emphasis should be placed on the 
exposition of the doctrine.  To that end, Justice Marshall’s opinion for the 
Court in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.,37 which is a model of clarity, 
should be highlighted rather than buried in the notes, as it is in Hart and 
Wechsler.38 
Studying the remedial law developed under § 1983 at the beginning of the 
course lays the groundwork for identifying another link between § 1983 and 
federal common law.  Besides substantive law, there is a remedial dimension 
to federal common law, illustrated by the cause of action for Fourth 
Amendment violations recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of 
Federal Bureau of Narcotics.39  This aspect of federal common law provides 
an opportunity to illustrate the differences between constitutional litigation and 
federal statutory litigation, where access to an implied remedy is quite 
limited.40  On the constitutional side, the Bivens remedy against federal 
authorities dovetails with the § 1983 remedy against state officers and local 
governments.  By studying the foundations for Bivens, students enhance their 
understanding of the policy rationale for Monroe, a rationale that is not fully 
articulated in Justice Douglas’s majority opinion in Monroe. 
We then put aside for a time the distinctive features of constitutional 
litigation and move to a higher level of generality, examining the availability 
of federal district court for federal question and diversity cases.  Here, too, the 
focus of attention is on the aspects of the doctrine that matter to someone who 
 
 34. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812); see FALLON, MANNING, MELTZER & SHAPIRO, supra note 
10, at 608. 
 35. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842); see FALLON, MANNING, MELTZER & SHAPIRO, supra note 
10, at 550. 
 36. 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see FALLON, MANNING, MELTZER & SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 
558. 
 37. 440 U.S. 715 (1979). 
 38. See FALLON, MANNING, MELTZER & SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 628. 
 39. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 40. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 290 (2001). 
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may actually use it to get into or stay out of federal court.  With that goal in 
mind, American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co.41 should receive 
comparatively more attention and doctrines like the “well-pleaded complaint” 
rule should take a back seat.  The point is that there is no modern case at odds 
with the affirmative principle for which American Well Works stands—that a 
litigant asserting a federal cause of action will have access to federal court.42 
Taking that rock solid principle as a starting point clarifies the issues raised by 
other cases as to whether and when a litigant may get to federal court even 
though his cause of action is created by state law.  The possible exceptions can 
then be identified with some specificity and taken up one at a time: (a) the 
principle illustrated by Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue 
Engineering & Manufacturing that “a federal court ought [sometimes] to be 
able to hear claims recognized under state law that nonetheless turn on 
substantial questions of federal law,”43 so long as (b) the federal issue appears 
on the face of a well-pleaded complaint;44 (c) the limits on the well-pleaded 
complaint principle, for example, where the federal issue appears on the face 
of a compulsory counterclaim,45 or where the litigation is for a declaratory 
judgment;46 and (d) the principle that the plaintiff is ordinarily, but not always, 
“the master of the complaint.”47 
All of these matters concern the statutory scope of federal jurisdiction.  For 
several reasons, the constitutional issue of how far Congress may go under 
Article III in expanding federal jurisdiction ought to be saved for later in the 
course.  One reason for putting the constitutional issue elsewhere is that some 
students are confused by the juxtaposition of materials on the constitutional 
issue, which generally recognize broad congressional power, and the limits 
imposed by the jurisdictional statutes and the Court’s interpretation of them.  
In addition, the constitutional issue has little practical significance, as very few 
real-world jurisdictional issues involve a need to determine the outer limits of 
Congress’s power.  Finally, the “outer bounds” issue has more in common with 
other Article III issues, notably Congress’s power to restrict federal 
jurisdiction in favor of either the state courts or non-Article III federal 
tribunals. 
 
 41. 241 U.S. 257 (1916). 
 42. Id. at 259–60. 
 43. 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005). 
 44. See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908). 
 45. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830–32 (2002). 
 46. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 17–19 (1983). 
 47. Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 6–8 (2003). 
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B. Discussing Potential Obstacles to Federal Court Access 
Having examined the primary vehicles for obtaining access to federal court 
for federal questions in general and constitutional claims in particular, we turn 
to a variety of obstacles that may arise, principally but not exclusively in 
constitutional cases.  I begin with justiciability and standing to sue.  Here, we 
have one of the big differences between a litigation-oriented approach and the 
traditional organization of a Federal Courts course.  In the latter, the center of 
attention in cases on justiciability and standing is the separation of powers 
between the Executive, Congress, and the federal judiciary.  The “case” 
requirement of Article III defines the boundaries of judicial power, and the task 
at hand is to identify the attributes of a “case.”  When one does this at the 
outset of the course, as in Hart and Wechsler, students must undertake that 
project as though it were a freestanding inquiry with, for all they know, 
significant implications for a wide range of disputes.  Lacking grounding in the 
standard principles of constitutional litigation, they do not have a firm idea as 
to what is, and is not, at stake in deciding standing and justiciability issues. 
In my view, it is more effective simply as a matter of pedagogy to take up 
these matters after studying § 1983.  By the time one arrives at standing and 
justiciability, students already understand that these obstacles only apply to 
suits seeking prospective relief.  Litigants who can show past injury will have 
access to federal court at least for their damages claims.48  They are also 
familiar with the limits on the utility of damages actions and can appreciate the 
factors that give rise to efforts to obtain prospective relief.  They have 
encountered enough examples of constitutional litigation to have learned that 
in the ordinary course of things persons complaining about government action 
that adversely affects them will have no difficulty with standing and 
justiciability.  Knowing the basics equips them to appreciate the range of 
circumstances, involving widely shared or hypothetical or arguably dated 
harms that give rise to justiciability and standing problems.  They are familiar 
with the terrain and can quickly grasp the means one may employ to avoid 
many of the problems.  Thus, the issue of congressional power to confer 
standing is an interesting and important one, but students should learn that 
sometimes there are ways to sidestep the problem altogether.  For example, the 
plaintiffs in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife evidently could have established 
“injury” without Congress’s aid by buying plane tickets to visit the 
environmentally sensitive areas they were concerned about.49  The ripeness 
issue raised by an anticipatory challenge to an enforcement statute may be 
avoided by asking the prosecutor what he would do in the event of a violation. 
 
 48. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983). 
 49. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
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Sovereign immunity is another obstacle to winning a federal constitutional 
or statutory challenge.  In the traditional approach to Federal Courts law, this 
topic is treated as a major issue in federal-state relations.  One discusses the 
nature of sovereignty, the lessons of history, and the significance of the 
adoption of the original Constitution and of the post-Civil War amendments.  
As a matter of theory, it is hard to argue with this way of dealing with the area, 
for Supreme Court decisions according constitutional status to sovereign 
immunity do in fact shield state governments from suit for violations of federal 
law.  But, theory is one thing and practice is another.  In the everyday world of 
litigation, the doctrine has less impact than the theory behind it may imply.50  
Students who have become familiar with § 1983 know going into the chapter 
that, with very few exceptions, the doctrine does not apply to suits against local 
governments and officials.  They have learned that a suit for prospective relief, 
aimed at the state officials who administer the relevant state law, can assure 
state compliance with federal mandates going forward.  They see sovereign 
immunity for what it is—a barrier to obtaining backward-looking relief against 
a state government.  In my teaching experience, this ability to situate the 
doctrine in real world remedial context significantly aids students in 
understanding and evaluating the Eleventh Amendment case law. 
Litigants who avoid both justiciability and sovereign immunity problems 
may still have to contend with abstention, res judicata, and related doctrines.  
The abstention doctrine from Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co. 
needs to be examined,51 but that doctrine receives somewhat different 
treatment under my approach than in the Hart and Wechsler paradigm.  For a 
devotee of Hart and Wechsler, Pullman is an archetypal case.  It has a 
complex, trans-substantive Legal Process-based underpinning, drawing on the 
principle that state courts should decide state law issues as well as the policy of 
avoiding unnecessary constitutional rulings.  The whole Pullman doctrine is a 
feast for anyone interested in the principles of federalism and separation of 
powers, with its referral to state court, its requirement that the litigants reserve 
their right to return to federal court, and its questions as to what happens if 
state courts balk at doing just what they are told and no more.  Unsurprisingly, 
Hart and Wechsler lavishes attention on it.52  But in practice, the Pullman 
doctrine has been largely superceded by the practice of certification, which is 
both broader in scope (applying to state law as well as federal issues) and less 
 
 50. See Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, Who’s Afraid of the Eleventh Amendment? The 
Limited Impact of the Court’s Sovereign Immunity Rulings, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 213, 215 (2006); 
Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, Effective Alternatives to Causes of Action Barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 715, 727 (2006). 
 51. 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941). 
 52. See FALLON, MANNING, MELTZER & SHAPIRO , supra note 10, at 1057–72. 
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complex in operation (one simply sends a letter to the state court).53  Burford,54 
Colorado River,55 Thibodaux,56 the anti-injunction act,57 and other narrow 
abstention doctrines come next. 
The most complex and important abstention doctrine, of course, is the one 
set forth in its modern form in Younger v. Harris.58  Here again, studying § 
1983 first has pedagogical advantages.  A student who reads Younger without 
first having mastered § 1983 may infer from the Younger Court’s rhetoric 
about “comity” and “Our Federalism”59 that state courts are the favored forums 
for constitutional claims.  At any rate, that is the inference I drew when I read 
the case as a student.  In my course, however, students are better prepared to 
put the case in proper perspective because they learn the first week of class that 
exhaustion of state remedies is not required before bringing a § 1983 suit.  It is 
easy for them to grasp that despite Younger’s rhetoric, efforts to apply its 
principle outside the context of pending state proceedings of some kind have 
generally fallen short.  With the basic principle in place, one achieves clarity in 
presenting the doctrine by minimizing discussion of history and theory in favor 
of identifying obstacles and opportunities available to litigants.  To that end, 
we organize the examination of Younger by identifying the variety of 
circumstances that may count in either aiding or hindering access to federal 
court and by taking them up one at a time. 
The ultimate impact of Younger can be grasped only by understanding how 
it works in combination with the principles of issue and claim preclusion.60  
Accordingly, the best time to address that topic (along with the famously 
obscure Rooker-Feldman doctrine)61 is immediately after Younger.  Having 
already become familiar with the general principles of § 1983 litigation, 
students have the tools necessary to not only master the interplay between 
Younger and collateral estoppel but to also appreciate both the reach and the 
limits of Younger and its progeny. 
 
 53. To its credit, after fifteen pages on the largely outmoded Pullman doctrine, Hart and 
Wechsler discusses certification briefly but adequately.  See id. at 1072–75. 
 54. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 334 (1943). 
 55. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 825–26 (1976). 
 56. La. Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 27–30 (1959). 
 57. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972); Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of 
Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281 (1970) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2283). 
 58. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
 59. Id. at 44. 
 60. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980). 
 61. Here, emphasis should be placed not on Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 
(1923), or District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), but on the 
Supreme Court’s recent efforts to clarify and limit the doctrine.  See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. 
Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005). 
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C. Discussing State Court Prerogatives and Jurisdiction in § 1983 Inquiries 
The course then turns to the distinctive statutory and constitutional issues 
that arise when federal issues are litigated in the state courts.  These include, 
among others, questions as to whether state courts can decline jurisdiction over 
federal claims and whether states may apply their own procedural law in 
resolving them.  Since the resolution of disputes on these matters depends on 
whether the state court’s approach will interfere with federal policy, the nature 
of the substantive rights at issue in these cases heavily influences the resolution 
of the “Federal Courts” issues as to limits on the state courts.  The advantage 
of beginning the course with § 1983 is that students are already well-schooled 
in the ways and means of constitutional litigation. 
Consequently, cases like Howlett v. Rose62 and Felder v. Casey,63 which 
raise issues of state court prerogatives in the § 1983 context, are especially 
effective teaching tools.  In similar fashion, the earlier discussion of federal 
question jurisdiction prepares students for studying exclusive federal 
jurisdiction and removal from state to federal court.  By contrast, it seems to 
me that Hart and Wechsler needlessly baffles students by discussing situations 
in which federal jurisdiction may be exclusive before explaining its general 
scope. 
Supreme Court review of state judgments is a necessary part of any 
Federal Courts book.  In my conception of the course, the best time to treat it is 
immediately after the discussion of federal law in the state courts; every case 
subject to Supreme Court review is one in which there is some federal issue 
either in the foreground or the background of state court litigation.  The time 
has also come for discussion of the subtle questions raised by the adequate and 
independent state ground doctrine.64  Students may have greater difficulty with 
these matters when they are raised early in the course, as they are when one 
follows Hart and Wechsler. 
Article III recognizes some power in Congress to favor state courts over 
federal lower courts and to even restrict Supreme Court jurisdiction to review 
state court rulings.  Rather than taking up questions of congressional power 
over federal jurisdiction at the beginning, as in the Hart and Wechsler 
approach, I address them at the end.  My premise here is that the issues are 
hard, and students who know more about Federal Courts law are probably 
better prepared to tackle them than students who know less.  However, a 
potential objection to my approach needs to be acknowledged.  Since Congress 
rarely interferes in a problematic way with federal jurisdiction, these issues 
 
 62. 496 U.S. 356 (1990). 
 63. 487 U.S. 131 (1988). 
 64. For a discussion of some of the issues I have in mind, see Henry Paul Monaghan, 
Supreme Court Review of State-Court Determinations of State Law in Constitutional Cases, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 1919 (2003). 
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cannot easily be integrated into a litigation-oriented course that emphasizes the 
issues routinely faced by lawyers.  At the same time, the anti-theoretical thrust 
of the course must give way before the critical separation of powers issues 
raised by the few cases we have in the area.  My hope is that they can be dealt 
with more effectively at the end rather than at the beginning of the course, 
simply because students can now approach them with a broader base of 
knowledge as to how the federal system actually operates. 
III.  THE CASE FOR A LITIGATION-ORIENTED APPROACH 
It is a truism, but one worth repeating here, that in determining how to 
teach a course, the first step is to decide what the teacher aims to achieve with 
it.  The choice of materials, how to organize them, what to spend more or less 
time on, and every other decision depend on what one hopes to accomplish.  
My objective in teaching Federal Courts is to prepare students for the 
jurisdictional and remedial problems they will face in litigating federal 
constitutional and statutory issues in federal and state courts, no matter which 
side of the case they represent.  In my view, this goal is best accomplished by: 
(a) focusing on matters that lawyers are most likely to encounter; (b) 
emphasizing the general principles governing constitutional litigation more 
than the odd intellectual puzzles that sometimes arise; (c) identifying in terms 
that are as concrete as possible the obstacles lawyers face when they seek to 
raise federal issues; and (d) identifying in similarly specific terms the means by 
which those obstacles may be overcome.  In pursuing these ends, it seems to 
me that the teacher ought to spend comparatively more time on matters that 
students cannot pick up on their own and that are not taught in other courses. 
A. Foregoing the Theoretically Stimulating for the Pragmatically Significant 
With these aims in mind, the case for putting § 1983 first and fitting as 
much of the course as possible into its framework emerges from the foregoing 
discussion of how the sequencing of topics radically diverges from Hart and 
Wechsler.  Today, § 1983 is not merely a tool, but rather, is the tool for 
constitutional claimants to go on the offense, raising federal constitutional (and 
some statutory) claims as plaintiffs rather than merely using them as defensive 
shields.65  Whatever other means may be available, its dominance is assured by 
the availability of attorney’s fees for successful plaintiffs in § 1983 suits under 
the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976.66  For this reason, it 
 
 65. The metaphor is borrowed from Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The 
Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532 (1972).  “Public law litigation” has distinctive 
features because cases are often conducted through § 1983 by plaintiffs who are seeking access to 
federal court to challenge state actors on federal constitutional and statutory grounds.  See Abram 
Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976). 
 66. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006). 
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seems to me that everyone who plans to litigate federal issues as counsel for 
plaintiffs or defendants ought to know the basics of § 1983.  Federal common 
law should come next because the lawmaking powers of the federal courts 
influence everything they do, not just in § 1983 litigation but across the whole 
range of federal statutory law and in matters ostensibly governed by state law.  
Federal district court jurisdiction comes third because the ground has been 
prepared for showing students the full range of opportunities for access to 
federal court as well as limits on access (such as the well-pleaded complaint 
rule). 
Learning these basic and broadly relevant principles prepares students for 
their encounter with the sometimes opaque, confusing, and intricate set of 
obstacles set up by doctrines of justiciability, standing, sovereign immunity, 
abstention, and res judicata.  Students who have mastered the general 
principles governing § 1983 litigation are well-prepared to understand and deal 
with the specific circumstances that give rise to this whole range of problems.  
Students who study these doctrines before studying § 1983 and federal 
question jurisdiction may struggle to place matters like “standing” or 
“abstention” into real world context.  Students who come without that 
background to the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause standing cases may 
easily conclude that standing is rarely available to bring Establishment Clause 
challenges.  They may fail to appreciate the importance of the “pendingness” 
predicate of Younger abstention, and thus infer that Younger is a bigger 
stumbling block than it actually is for a litigant seeking to challenge a state 
statute on constitutional grounds.  Students may think that sovereign immunity 
is a major—rather than a comparatively minor—obstacle to most efforts to 
enforce federal law against state governments, at least prospectively. 
Emphasizing these matters necessarily requires giving less attention to 
others.  Under a litigation-oriented approach to Federal Courts, the primary 
criteria for deciding how much time to devote to a particular topic are: (a) 
relevance to law practice; (b) difficulty; and (c) unfamiliarity.  A litigation-
oriented approach invests comparatively less time in theoretically interesting 
matters like Congress’s power over the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction.  This 
approach also foregoes a systematic treatment of doctrines like “justiciability 
and standing,” “judicial federalism,” and “suits challenging official action.”  
They are examined with the specific aim of identifying their impact on the 
opportunities available for litigating federal claims.  The policies on which 
they rest are introduced only to the extent those policies bear on current issues.  
One largely ignores the historical development of these topics, except insofar 
as history informs current debates.  The equitable origins of abstention and the 
common law background of standing receive little attention.  On the other 
hand, some historical matters cannot be avoided.  Thanks to the Supreme 
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Court’s obsession with historical analysis of state sovereign immunity,67 one 
cannot avoid discussing eighteenth century understandings of that doctrine. 
B. Distinguishing § 1983’s Teaching Function from Its Scholarly Function 
A Hartian critic may object that a litigation-oriented approach falls short 
because it fails to explore all of the implications of Legal Process theory for 
issues of judicial federalism and separation of powers.  It is true that a 
litigation-oriented approach concentrates on working within the current 
jurisdictional framework.  Its agenda is to identify a range of concrete issues as 
to the availability of a given court and a given body of law—state or federal as 
the case may be.  By highlighting large questions of federal-state relations and 
the role of courts vis-à-vis the other branches, Hart and Wechsler treats current 
jurisdictional law as one among many alternatives.  As such, it invites 
speculation as to how principles of federalism and separation of powers may 
play out over a range of historical and potential future problems before taking 
up § 1983 and other well-established features of our system.  A litigation-
oriented approach sacrifices that opportunity when it recognizes up front that § 
1983, federal common law, and the federal question jurisdiction provide a 
framework for addressing many of the problems that come up in the workaday 
world of law practice.  A discrete set of sovereign immunity, abstention, 
justiciability, and standing principles provide tools for dealing with most of the 
remaining issues that arise in federal litigation. 
The choice between Hart and Wechsler and a litigation-oriented approach 
turns on whether, from a pedagogical perspective, the benefits of greater 
attention to the Legal Process are worth the cost.  The cost is difficulty in 
clarifying current jurisdictional arrangements.  For example, students in 
courses following the Hart and Wechsler model typically do not reach § 1983 
until late in the course.  Even then, the statute receives only cursory attention 
in many of the casebooks.  In the meantime, students are asked to work their 
way through the thicket of history, policy, and detail demanded by the effort to 
apply Legal Process principles to such matters as the attributes of a “case,” the 
identifying features of a federal “question,” the nature of “injury,” and 
“federal-state court parity.”  If the benefits of putting a theoretical treatment of 
judicial federalism and separation of powers issues in the forefront are great 
enough, the cost is worth bearing.  But that cost should not be minimized.  It 
consists of the lost opportunity to give systematic attention to the distinctive 
set of concrete federalism and separation of powers issues raised in litigation 
under § 1983 and other federal statutes.  To be sure, students need to learn the 
 
 67. Compare Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006) (history supports 
congressional authority under Article I bankruptcy power to subject states to monetary liability) 
with Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (history supports state immunity from such 
congressional efforts under Article I commerce power). 
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lessons that Hart and Wechsler and their descendants can teach about “what is 
sayable and unsayable, relevant and irrelevant, persuasive and unpersuasive in 
legal arguments about Federal Courts issues.”68  A litigation-oriented course 
easily satisfies that need.  However, it is a poor use of class time to extensively 
analyze topics that pique the interest of academics but that do not actually 
count for much in the resolution of real-world Federal Courts questions.  That 
time is better spent on issues students will surely encounter in litigation. 
My argument against the traditional focus of Federal Courts is limited in 
two ways.  First, I focus here on the teaching of Federal Courts law to law 
students.  How we should approach Federal Courts scholarship is a separate 
matter.  While I believe that the approach I sketch here will maximize the 
value of the course for students, it certainly should not control anyone’s 
scholarly agenda.  In that arena, there is no reason at all to curb one’s interest 
in legal theory or ambition to contribute to it.  No topic, no matter how 
academic it may be, should be excluded from that agenda.  Second, I am 
concerned with how to teach the basic Federal Courts course.  Schools with 
sufficient resources should offer advanced courses or seminars on the 
application of Legal Process theory and the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm to 
address the problems students studied in the basic course on Federal Courts 
law.  Students with a firm grounding in the basics of federal jurisdiction would 
be well prepared for such a course.  An additional advantage of a specialized 
course is that other perspectives besides Hart and Wechsler could also be 
explored.  As Professor Fallon has recognized, “anyone with a critical agenda 
might wish to broaden the framework, to attempt to describe a systematic 
relationship between Federal Courts doctrine and, for example, the class 
interests or characteristic biases of dominant groups.”69 
CONCLUSION 
Deciding how to teach a course always involves some balance between the 
professor’s scholarly interests and the needs of law students.70  Federal Courts 
teachers are the heirs to a great intellectual tradition.  Yet, they should be 
cautious and not allow their own fascination with the subject matter of the 
course exercise too much influence over what they choose to teach.  I submit 
 
 68. Fallon, supra note 20, at 10. 
 69. Id. at 12. 
 70. I should note that my preference for building the course around § 1983 reflects my 
scholarly interests in that area.  A teacher disenchanted with the Hart and Wechsler approach and 
coming to the course from a procedural background may well prefer to concentrate on the 
relations between civil procedure and judicial federalism.  Casebooks amenable to that approach 
include WRIGHT, OAKLEY & BASSETT, supra note 26, and HOWARD P. FINK, LINDA S. 
MULLENIX, THOMAS D. ROWE, JR. & MARK V. TUSHNET, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 2007). 
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that they may have paid too little attention to the growth of § 1983 as a vehicle 
for litigating public law questions and the consequent need for students to 
thoroughly understand it.  In addition, I believe that students benefit from an 
approach that integrates many other topics covered in the course—including 
justiciability and standing, sovereign immunity, and abstention—into a § 1983 
framework.  It is time to rethink the teaching of Federal Courts law, put § 1983 
at the center, and relegate concepts of “Federalism” and “Separation of 
Powers” to a supporting, though still significant, role. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
874 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:857 
 
